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Executive Summary
In 1990 ballot Measure 5 passed, which limited the property tax rate that counties could levy to
$15 per $1000 assessed value in Oregon. In 1997 voters approved Measure 50, after first
approving the similar Measure 47 in 1996, which prevents the assessed value of all individual
properties from increasing more than 3% per year beginning with the 1995-96 tax year. Both
measures are embedded in the state constitution. As shown in a previous Northwest Economic
Research Center (NERC) study1, one consequence of these tax limitations is inequitable tax
burdens. Following up on this finding, Common Ground requested that the Northwest
Economic Research Center undertake a simulation of an alternative tax structure to determine
if a Land Value Tax (LVT) would lead to increased equity and incentives to utilize land more
wisely in concert with Oregon’s statewide growth management program enacted in 1973.
The analytical approach adopted for this study develops in two steps. First, an exemption from
M-5 and M-50 limitations. This would allow assessments to revert to real market value (RMV)
instead of the limited-growth maximum assessed value (MAV). It would also allow the tax rate
on land assessments to reach the higher levels required under LVT. Since RMV assessments are
by now considerably higher than MAV assessments, the applied tax rates are proportionally
reduced so that the simulated tax outcome is revenue neutral. First stage simulation results
will compare taxes on selected properties under two scenarios – MAV and RMV under the
equal rate tax.
The second step is to simulate a change from the present equal rate tax to a split rate tax – a
higher rate on land assessments and lower rate on improvements. Variations in simulated tax
levies in all three trials occur at the parcel level. These are first aggregated by land use class
and later by level of land utilization. Much of this NERC study is limited to examining the effects
of LVT on two illustrative communities: Inner Northeast (INE) and Outer Southeast (OSE). Both
of which have a mix of vacant, commercial, industrial, and single-family property types.
As mentioned earlier, a major motivator for investigating alternative property tax structures is
the regressivity of the current system. The following graph displays the equitability issue of the
current tax system across several measurements (see Figure E.S.1). First, the horizontal axis for
each is the estimated median household income for the property.2 The vertical axis is a
measurement of tax payment—the current effective mill rate (tax per $1,000 of RMV). Next,
the two areas of analysis are differentiated by color with Outer-Southeast in red, and InnerNortheast in blue. Lastly, the size of the data points indicates the number of households at the
specific income level.

1

“Oregon Property Tax Capitalization: Evidence from Portland”. Available at www.pdx.edu/nerc/projects
American Community Survey Data by Census tract. Available at: www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/data.html
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Figure E.S.1: Effective RMV Mill Rate by Income and Community
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There are clear differences in many of the measurements within Figure E.S.1. While estimated
median incomes in Outer-Southeast are clustered around $40,000, there is far more spread in
incomes in Inner-Northeast, ranging from $60,000 to $100,000. However, the amount of RMV
that is taxable is generally higher in Outer-Southeast, the lower income area. This indicates
consistent growth in RMV in excess of the 3% limit imposed by Measure 50 for the InnerNortheast community, and results in inequitable tax payments.
Figure E.S.2 below displays the effective mill rates resulting from the 90/10 LVT. The separate
rates on land and improvement value results in a significantly more balanced rate distribution
than in Figure E.S.1 above. Furthermore, a LVT system would be slightly income progressive (as
opposed to the marked regressivity shown in Figure 1).
Figure E.S.2: Effective LVT Mill Rate by Income and Community

Effecitve LVT Mill Rate

$14
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4
$2
$0
$20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000 $60,000 $70,000 $80,000 $90,000 $100,000 $110,000

Median Household Income by Census Tract

Northwest Economic
Research Center

2

LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: Simulating the Effects in Multnomah County

This is only one result of the analysis. Other sections of this report highlight how an LVT
implemented in Multnomah County would incentivize development, shift taxes based on landuse class, and encourage land improvements. There is also a discussion of potential regressive
outcomes, and how to mitigate them with carefully crafted legislation or other tax structures
(such as the AXI building exemption tax discussed on pages 28-31).
Ultimately, land-based property tax systems, whether a split-rate LVT or an AXI building
exemption tax, do what they are designed to do—place more of the tax burden on wealthier
landowners, and encourage the highest and best use of land. Based on the simulations
performed on the INE and OSE communities, a LVT would provide a more equitable tax
structure, incentivize upgrading and developing properties, and discourage “holding” land for
speculative purposes. Furthermore, the potential downsides of the tax policy—such as
increasing taxes on low-income homeowners—can be mitigated with carefully crafted
legislation. In short, many of the inequities created by Measure 5 and 50 would likely be
reversed if a LVT were implemented in the Portland region.
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Introduction
In 1990 ballot Measure 5 passed, which limited the property tax rate that counties could levy to
$15 per $1000 assessed value in Oregon. In 1997 voters approved Measure 50, after first
approving the similar Measure 47 in 1996, which prevents the assessed value of all individual
properties from increasing more than 3% per year beginning with the 1995-96 tax year. Both
measures are embedded in the state constitution. As shown in a previous Northwest Economic
Research Center (NERC) study3, one consequence of these tax limitations is inequitable tax
burdens. Following up on this finding, Common Ground requested that the Northwest
Economic Research Center undertake a simulation of an alternative tax structure to determine
if a Land Value Tax (LVT) would lead to increased equity and incentives to utilize land more
intensely in concert with Oregon’s statewide growth management program enacted in 1973.
The analytical approach adopted for this study develops in two steps. First, an exemption from
M-5 and M-50 limitations. This would allow assessments to revert to real market value (RMV)
instead of the limited-growth maximum assessed value (MAV). It would also allow the tax rate
on land assessments to reach the higher levels required under LVT. Since RMV assessments are
by now considerably higher than MAV assessments, the applied tax rates are proportionally
reduced so that the simulated tax outcome is revenue neutral at the county level. First stage
simulation results will compare taxes on selected properties under two scenarios – MAV and
RMV under the equal rate tax.
The second step is to simulate a change from the present equal rate tax to a split rate tax – a
higher rate on land assessments and lower rate on improvements. The split rate is expressed as
an LVT Ratio, the percentage of the tax rate applied to the land assessment of all taxable
parcels. Split rates are determined on a revenue-neutral basis at the county level, and
assessments are RMV. Thus, total county revenue will be the same for (i) the conventional
equal rate tax with MAV assessments, (ii) an equal rate RMV tax (step 1), and the split rate land
value tax (step 2). Variations in simulated tax levies in all three trials occur at the parcel level.
These are first aggregated by land use class and later by level of land utilization.
This study consists of model simulations of tax shift progressing from the present conventional
tax to real market value assessments and land value taxation in two contrasting Portland
communities.
This analysis aims to respond to the following questions:
 Do owners possessing similar property attributes receive more equitable tax treatment
under RMV assessments; under LVT?

3

“Oregon Property Tax Capitalization: Evidence from Portland”. Available at www.pdx.edu/nerc/projects
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How do the assessments and tax burdens of
residents in gentrifying regions differ from what
they are now?
Do the tax incentives accompanying LVT
encourage upgrading and discourage land
speculation?
Are certain classes of land users overburdened?
Does tax shift accompanying LVT help mitigate
expected increases in some property assessments
due to the change from MAV to RMV?
What tax relief measures might be appropriate in
hardship cases: An alternative land-based tax? A
property tax deferral?

Background
The conception of land value taxation is attributed to 19th
century political economist Henry George’s work on the
extraction of land rent. Georgist theory of land taxation
holds that a property tax based upon site values provides
an incentive to bring land into productive use;
simultaneously, a reduction or abolition of taxes on site
improvements should encourage more efficient land use.
Land value taxation (LVT) taxes the highest use value of
land4, in contrast to conventional property taxes
structures which include the value of buildings or other
improvements when assessing value. LVT is intended to
counter the monopolization of land and incentivize
landowners to use their land more productively.
Oregon Property Tax Laws
Oregon’s convoluted property tax rules motivate the
current conversation about LVT. The passage of
Measures 5 and 50 drastically changed the way property
taxes were assessed in Oregon. The cumulative effects of
4

5

Calculating Property Taxes
under the Current System
Calculating the actual tax due for a
household can be complicated due to the
multiple rates and valuation methods.
The calculation begins with the
comparison of two values, based on a
property’s MAV and RMV. Based on its
location in various taxing districts, each
property will have a number of
government tax rates and a number of
education tax rates. The sum of these
rates is then multiplied by the MAV to
calculate the base tax. If the calculated
base tax exceeds the Measure 5 cap of
1.5% of current RMV, any temporary
voter approved property tax measure for
specific services (such as increased
funding for public safety, libraries or
schools) is reduced first, all the way to $0
if necessary. If the taxes still exceed
Measure 5 caps, each permanent tax rate
component within the base tax is then
compressed proportionally such that the
base tax will equal the Measure 5 cap.
In order to calculate final taxes, the
bonded general government and bonded
education rates, which fund capital
construction projects, such as new
buildings or equipment, are multiplied by
the MAV and added to the base tax.
These bonded rates are not subject to the
property tax caps.

The reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property that is physically possible,
appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value. The four criteria the highest and
best use must meet are legal permissibility, physical possibility, financial feasibility, and maximum productivity.
(Definition from the Appraisal Institute: The Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th Edition, p. 333)
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limiting the growth of property assessments under Ballot Measure 50 are continuous revenue
shortfalls, an increasing disparity between true market values and taxable assessments and
unequal tax treatment of taxpayers with similarly valued property. A 2018 Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities report identifies Oregon as one of four states where property tax
structures exacerbate economic inequities, and a 2017 Oregonian article concludes that
Oregon’s property tax system has dramatically distorted the tax burden in the Portland area.
City Club of Portland’s 2013 report critiques the current system, suggesting that it is
inequitable, undermines local control, and difficult to comprehend.5 A 2014 report by East
Portland Action Plan (EPAP) Housing Subcommittee came to similar conclusions, recommending
a “Reset of assessed property value on sale” to deal with the inequities created by the current
property tax system.6
In 2014 the Northwest Economic Research Center (NERC) published a study on the effects of
Measures 5 and 50 on property tax capitalization in Portland. In that study, NERC specifically
sought to understand – if two houses are similar in all ways except for their property tax
payments, do their sale prices differ as a result? The study concluded that tax payments are
having a significant effect on sale prices. Assuming a discount rate of 3% and a perpetual
lifespan of properties, we expect a property that would last into perpetuity to show
capitalization of $33.33 for every dollar decrease in property taxes. Depending on the
estimation specification, we found that the capitalization of property taxes into property value
in the Portland area ranges from 15% to 92%.7
Effects of Measures 5 and 50
The two measures created two separate limits that come into play depending on the MAV and
RMV of a property.



Measure 5 Limit: Maximum Allowable Tax
=$15 per thousand dollars of RMV
Measure 50 Limit: Maximum Annual Growth in MAV=3%

If the levy according to the property’s Levy Code Area (LCA) is greater than the maximum
allowable tax, compression occurs, reducing the amount of tax each jurisdiction can collect.

5

City Club of Portland. (2013). “Reconstructing Oregon’s Frankentax: Improving the Equity, Financial Sustainability,
and Effeciency of Property Taxes”. Retrieved from: http://members.pdxcityclub.com/library/reportarchive
6
East Portland Action Plan, Housing Subcommittee. (2013). “Property Tax Inequity Analysis”. Retrieved from:
http://eastportlandactionplan.org/sites/default/files
7
“Oregon Property Tax Capitalization: Evidence from Portland”. Available at www.pdx.edu/nerc/projects
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According to Linhares & Provost, the Oregon property tax system is functioning in line with
what voters approved more than two decades ago.8 They explain that the bulk of responsibility
to fund public education has been shifted to the state and property tax bills have been made
more predictable; however, these outcomes are tilted in favor of the property owner, and in
some cases restrict revenue streams necessary for state and local governments to provide
adequate services. Portland based organizations like City Club of Portland and East Portland
Action Plan identified several issues with the Oregon system as it is currently functioning:





The system contains and is exacerbating inequities
It appears to be undermining local control
It is failing to maintain voter approved service levels
The system is extremely complex which undermines constituent confidence

Additionally, property tax imposed in Oregon as a whole has been growing at a decreasing rate
since 2010, while inflation has been growing at a consistently higher rate. This relationship can
be observed in Multnomah County where total property tax imposed grew by a little less than
1.4 percent between 2011 and 2012 while inflation grew by 2.3 percent.9
Among the above-mentioned issues, perhaps one of the most prominent is that the Oregon
system has effectively disconnected the amount paid in property taxes from the value of the
property. This results in horizontal inequity, the case in which property owners with similarly
valued properties and levels of service pay dramatically different property tax rates. NERC’s
2014 report concludes that this disconnect creates a distortion in the market for houses and
condos, and from a policy perspective, arbitrarily benefits some property owners and harms
others. In reference to these critiques, alternatives to the current system have been proposed.
One proposition is a shift to a system that relies primarily on Land Value Taxation.

Literature on LVT
In conventional property tax systems, the property tax rate applies to both the value of land
and improvements made upon it. Building on a parcel of land or making major structural
improvements will increase the assessed value, thereby increasing the property tax bill. This
equal rate property tax, in theory, disincentivizes capital investments in real estate, as it
increases the cost. By way of contrast, LVT relies on the realistic assumption that land is a fixed
commodity and designates property taxes based on the “highest and best use” (HBU) value of
the land. Landowners are incentivized to pursue the most efficient land investment under LVT.
LVT theory also disincentivizes speculative land purchases and the “holding” of land out of
production with the intention of reselling it at a higher price. A high tax on the HBU value of
8

Linhares, T., & Provost, E. (2011). Recent History of Oregon’s Property Tax System. Available at:
www.tsccmultco.com/graphics/Recent_History_jan_2012.pdf
9
Oregon Department of Revenue. (2013). Oregon Property Tax Statistics from fiscal year 1997-98 to present.
Available at: www.oregon.gov/dor/STATS/Pages/statistics.aspx#property
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land increases holding costs to a level which is less financially viable. Buyers would avoid
purchasing land they did not intend to improve upon.
Another key component of LVT theory is land conservation. It shifts tax burden onto the
extensive use of finite goods society wishes to conserve. As described by Durning and Bauman
in “Tax Shift,” LVT is a tax that moves taxes away from things we want more of – that is
productive uses, and toward a limited resource – land, the consumption we want less of.10
While LVT is income progressive in the aggregate, there are situations where lower income
owners face increased costs. There are methods of mitigating these negative effects and are
discussed in the “Mitigation” section below.
Proponents of LVT argue that changes in land value is created by the community while capital
investments come from landowners.11 Thus, communities should benefit from the value they
created as landowners benefit from their investments. A “pure” form of LVT would capture the
full annual land value, applying the entire tax rate to land assessments, while split rates capture
a portion of the annual land value, applying a partial tax rate to land and a partial rate to
improvements.
Several economists have produced research seeking to understand the potential outcomes of
implementing LVT systems. Due to the lack of adoption of LVT in the U.S., nearly all of these
studies rely on simulation methods to draw conclusions. Key concerns when analyzing the
viability of a switch to LVT include generating sufficient revenue, increasing overall welfare
through capital improvements, and understanding how the tax burden shifts. Most literature
on LVT suggests it would result in a more income progressive distribution of tax burden, lower
housing costs, and increased capital investment but are uncertain about the financial
feasibility.12 In Oregon, the current property tax structure creates assessed values lower than
real market values, leading to relatively lower tax revenues than the property values suggest.
Thus, generating sufficient revenue under LVT should not be difficult in Oregon. While not the
central focus of most empirical studies, many acknowledge that LVT can create undue burden
for certain types of households without carefully crafted legislation.
Specifically, people who are “land rich and income poor” pose a problem when considering a
switch to LVT. One of the key motivators for LVT is to create a situation where those with low
incomes bear lower incidence. However, in urban areas where land value has grown
significantly in a relatively short amount of time there are undoubtedly people who live in
homes near urban centers that earn relatively low incomes. For these homeowners, LVT would
10

Durning, A. T.; Bauman, Y. (1998). “Tax Shift”. Northwest Environment Watch. Seattle, Washington.
Dye, R., & England, W. (2010) Assessing the Theory and Practice of Land Value Taxation. Available at:
www.lincolninst.edu
12
Song, Y., & Zenou, Y. (2006). Property tax and urban sprawl: Theory and implications for US cities. Available at:
Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 60, Issue 3
11
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likely increase their tax incidence. However, measures such as delaying a switch to LVT until
death or sale and implementing a lower LVT/RMV ratio for overburdened landowners are policy
measures that could correct for these situations and are discussed in the “Mitigation” section
below.
LVT in the United States
Some regions in the United States have adopted LVT, including counties in Pennsylvania,
Hawaii, Connecticut and Alabama. The duration and outcomes vary by situation. Some
successfully implemented LVT for decades while others lasted only for a few years. For
example, in Pennsylvania, where LVT was most widely adopted, some counties and cities are
still using it, while others have repealed it.13 The city of Pittsburgh instituted a split-rate LVT in
1913 and used it for nearly a century before reverting to a traditional property tax in 2001. In
this instance, research suggests LVT was repealed due to poor assessment and rate setting
practices despite evidence LVT encouraged building activity.14 In the Hawaii case, LVT taxation
was abandoned because it was seen as a cause of the overdevelopment of Waikiki in the
1970’s.
Smaller municipalities such as Harrisburg City, Scranton City, and DuBois City still use LVT today.
Subsequent studies by the Center for the Study of Economics in Philadelphia have shown
consistently higher building permit rates in the LVT cities.15 They have also cited several cities in
Pennsylvania showing that LVT also simplifies the assessment process. Under LVT, use of
computer aided mass appraisal (CAMA) enables cost-effective land assessment. Since LVT
deemphasizes the importance of improvement assessments, several Pennsylvania cities have
experienced fewer property tax appeals and have reduced assessor staff accordingly. While
simplifying assessment, LVT improves data collection and rate application.
While some variations and experimentation with land taxation are presently taking place in
Vermont and Connecticut, no other states in the U.S. have recently implemented LVT, leaving
no clear model for Oregon.

Methodology
This section covers the techniques required to calculate the levy mill rates for the purpose of
simulating property tax system changes, including RMV and LVT. Resulting levy mill rates will
ensure revenue neutrality, collecting the same level of revenue for the county as the current
conventional system. We use property tax data from the 2017-18 tax year, courtesy of the
Multnomah County Assessor's Office, comprised of 276,558 tax lots.

13

Bourassa, S. (1990). Land value taxation and housing development: Effects of the property tax reform in three
types of cities. Available at: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 49 Issue 1
14
Oates, W. E.; Schwab, R. M.. (1997). National Tax Journal. Available at www.ntanet.org
15
Center for the Study of Economics. (2009). Land Value Taxation in Philadelphia. Available at www.urbantools.org
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Most of the current inequity of Oregon’s property tax structure is driven by increasing
disparities in property values due to Measure 50 which limits the growth of MAV to the
minimum of RMV or 103% of the past year's MAV. For properties growing in value at 3% per
year, the taxable value of the property also grows at 3%, resulting in balanced levy payments.
However, the taxable share of value for properties experiencing high value growth falls, and
properties experiencing little growth may see their taxable share increase.
Over time, this creates a gap in the effective mill rates—the rate paid per thousand dollars of
RMV—for properties even within the same Levy Code Area (LCA). Figure 1 shows the spread of
MAV to RMV ratios across Multnomah County (i.e. what proportion of the property value is
taxed). The county-wide MAV to RMV ratio is 39.1%. Most properties pay tax on between 30
and 70% of the value of their property. High rates of growth in property values results in a
lower ratio, thus a lower effective mill rate, while growth below 3% leads to a higher ratio and
effective mill rate. This results in disparities in effective mill rates between high and low value
growth areas, resulting in the regressivity seen under the current tax system.

Density

Figure 1: Distribution of MAV to RMV Ratios for All Properties in Multnomah County

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

MAV to RMV Ratio for All Properties
Additionally, Measure 5 limits mill rates by property to $15 per thousand ($10 for general
government and $5 for education) of the property's RMV. For example, properties where $25
per thousand of MAV16 exceeds $15 per thousand of the RMV, the mill rate is compressed. This
compression largely occurs for properties with high MAV to RMV ratios in Levy Code Areas with
a mill rate above $15. Local Option Levy rates are compressed first, followed by special district,
city, and county taxes. To remove the compression caused by Measure 5, we return all tax rates
to their LCA rate, and to remove the Measure 50 limits, we simply swap their MAV for RMV in
the levy amount calculations.
In Multnomah County there are 124 Levy Code Areas that incorporate City, school district, and
fire district fees. LCA mill rates vary between $9.22 and $20.74 per thousand MAV. Because

16

A common Levy Code Area tax rate.
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aggregated RMV assessments are considerably higher than the total MAV, the rates will have to
be lowered to a set of LCA rates that yield the equivalent total county revenue.
In our calculations the total tax revenue equals the MAV for each property multiplied by that
property’s LCA tax rate. To allow for revenue neutrality after a shift away from Measure 5 and
50 limitations, we scale each rate by a fixed proportion. With this scale, every property’s tax
rate is reduced by a fixed proportion, which within our analysis comes to a 57.5% reduction in
nominal tax rates. This is represented using r as the rate of tax reduction as follows:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝

The reduction in tax rates, as well as the shifts away from Measures 5 and 50, represents a
stepping point from which to compare the current tax system and an LVT system to a situation
where the effective mill rate paid by each property is equal within LCAs.
LVT Ratio
Setting up an LVT requires calculating separate revenue-neutral mill rates for the two
components of RMV, and further complicates the above calculation. Since each property’s RMV
is composed of land value (LV) and improvement value (IV), we first separate the summation:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × (𝐿𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 + 𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 )
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝

= 𝑟𝐿 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝐿𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 + 𝑟𝐼 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝

By definition, the LCA rate of each property value component is equal regardless of the
separate rates for LV and IV. These are the current revenue generated from each property
component:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑟𝐿 × 𝐿𝑉 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑟𝐼 × 𝐼𝑉 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
From this point, we pick the rate multipliers that meet our desired rate outcome. The two
separate rate reduction terms above translate into the LVT ratio. This ratio determines how
differently we want to tax LV and IV. For any tax system which taxes LV and IV at the same rate,
there is $.50 in LV tax rate for every $.50 in IV tax rate; a 50/50 LVT ratio. If we increase the tax
rate on land, we get a higher LVT ratio. For example, a 90/10 LVT ratio represents $.90 in LV tax
rate for every $.10 in IV tax rate. The two LVT ratios used in this analysis are 90/10 and 60/40.
Using this methodology, NERC seeks to understand how a switch to LVT would affect revenue
generation, economic development, and property tax incidence in the Portland Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA).
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Areas of Analysis
Much of this NERC study is limited to examining the effects of LVT on two illustrative
communities (see Figure 2). Inner Northeast (INE) and Outer Southeast (OSE) both have a mix
of vacant, commercial, industrial, and single-family property types. However, they offer a
compelling contrast.
Inner Northeast is a residential and commercial district incorporating the Concordia, King and
Vernon neighborhoods in the Northeast quadrant of Portland. The larger community centers on
Alberta Street, and stretches approximately 2 miles, from Interstate 5 to NE 33rd Avenue,
bounded on the north by NE Ainsworth St. and NE Fremont St. on the south.
The Outer Southeast study area is comprised of Centennial, Powellhurst-Gilbert and Glenfair
neighborhoods. This community was outside the city limits until 1983 when Portland began its
annexation program. Single family lot sizes are very large, averaging over 9,000 sq. ft. compared
to 5,000 sq. ft. and trending smaller in INE. One explanation for this is the sanitary sewerage
system at the time (septic tanks). This large lot phenomenon will have implications for tax
burden when examining the effects of LVT.
Figure 2: Map of Two Areas of Analysis: Inner Northeast (INE) and Outer Southeast (OSE)
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As described above, Oregon’s current property tax system results in certain land user classes
paying higher effective tax rates. In both the INE and OSE, single family homeowners pay the
highest effective tax rate per RMV, while commercial properties pay the lowest effective RMV
in Inner-Northeast and rural properties pay the least in OSE.
Currently, landowners are assessed a tax rate based on an even combination of land value and
improvement value. Under the LVT ratio scenario used for analysis, land users would pay
property taxes based $.90 in land rate for every $.10 in improvement rate. The impact of the
split rates largely depends on the land share of property value. For Multnomah County, the
average land share of total value ratio is 39.5%. Thus, any property with a higher proportion of
their value in land will pay a higher effective tax rate under LVT. Table 1 provides a snapshot of
the percent of land RMV to total RMV for various land user classes in Multnomah County
(otherwise known as the Land-to-Total Value or LTV).
Table 1: Land Share of Total Value (LTV) for Different Land Use Classes
Land Use Class
Industrial
Office
Multi-Family
Commercial
Single Family
Restaurant
Vacant
Grand Total

LTV Ratio
20.1%
20.9%
24.3%
35.7%
45.6%
52.4%
98.0%
39.5%

Two problems arose with regard to land use classes on separate ends of the MAV to RMV ratio
spectrum. Condominiums largely have zero land value associated with their property values
and under an LVT would receive a substantial reduction in tax rate. Conversely, farm properties
derive the majority of their value from land and, though few in Portland, would receive a
similarly disproportionate increase in tax rate if assessed at market value. To mitigate any
impact of these large tax changes, we remove their property values from rate calculations and
assume these groups would be given special consideration under a LVT law. The following chart
shows the county-wide data used to calculate RMV tax rates and LVT split rates. It should be
noted that the county-wide MAV and effective RMV tax rates are $22.75 and $10.00
respectively.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Tax Shift Rate Calculation Maintaining Constant Revenue
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Comparing MAV/RMV Ratios
As mentioned earlier, a major motivator for investigating alternative property tax structures is
the regressivity of the current system. The following graph displays the equitability issue of the
current tax system across several measurements (see Figure 4). First, the horizontal axis for
each is the estimated median household income for the property.17 The vertical axis is a
measurement of tax payment—the current effective mill rate. Next, the two areas of analysis
are differentiated by color with Outer-Southeast in red, and Inner-Northeast in blue. Lastly,
the size of the data points indicates the number of households at the specific income level.

Current Effecitve Mill Rate

Figure 4: Effective RMV Mill Rate by Income and Community
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17

American Community Survey Data by Census tract. Available at: www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/data.html
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There are clear differences in many of the measurements within Figure 4. While estimated
median incomes in Outer-Southeast are clustered around $40,000, there is far more spread in
incomes in Inner-Northeast, ranging from $60,000 to $100,000. However, the amount of RMV
that is taxable is generally higher in Outer-Southeast, the lower income area. This indicates
consistent growth in RMV in excess of the 3% limit imposed by Measure 50 for the InnerNortheast community, and results in inequitable tax payments.

Implementing LVT
As mentioned in the Methodology section, the analysis progresses through two stages.
Measure 5 and Measure 50 limitations are exempted in the first stage, expressing values and
rates in terms of RMV. The second stage changes the RMV uniform rate scheme to a two-rate
90%/10% split rate land value tax regime. Positive or negative shift in tax burden on any given
parcel is determined by i) its land-to-total value (LTV) ratio (expressing the land value as a
fraction of the total assessed value), and ii) MAV/RMV ratio (showing how far its MAV lags
behind its RMV). As total tax revenue remains unchanged at the county level, a given parcel will
generally pay a higher levy if its MAV/RMV ratio is lower than the county’s average ratio.
Likewise, a property with a LTV ratio higher than the county’s average ratio will see a higher
levy. In terms of the incentive effects of LVT, parcels having low LTV ratio are seen to have a
higher utilization status. Thus, LVT is shifting tax burden from more efficiently used sites to less
efficiently utilized sites.
The reporting method we use here is to provide summary results by aggregating individual
parcels into land use categories. Simulated tax applications are performed on the entire array
of parcels in each community. Table 2 below summarizes these two ratios for each type of land
use in each community. As shown later in Table 3, first stage results are affected only by
MAV/RMV ratios. Parcels with low ratios will see positive tax shift. In the second stage,
however, sites with high LTV ratios will face higher tax payments.
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Table 2: Decomposition of Land Market Values for Various Land Use Types
Land Use Description
INNER NORTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4 units or more
Commercial
Commercial - Auto Related
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Vacant
Total
OUTER SOUTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4 units or more
Commercial
Commercial - Auto Related
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Mobile Home
Vacant
Total

# Parcels

MAV – RMV Ratio

LTV Ratio

8,371
575
87
237
12
31
34
32
242
9,621

0.30
0.24
0.31
0.21
0.18
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.17
0.29

0.46
0.43
0.16
0.27
0.54
0.27
0.36
0.58
0.99
0.43

13,351
485
268
229
41
28
57
35
48
517
15,059

0.58
0.64
0.45
0.48
0.49
0.52
0.38
0.62
0.50
0.37
0.55

0.49
0.44
0.23
0.38
0.51
0.39
0.55
0.33
0.60
0.99
0.45

The tax shifts in each stage and combined effects are shown in three panels of Table 3. Panel A
compares the two tax regimes, showing the difference when moving from MAV assessments
and current rates to RMV assessments and derived rates. Differences are clear when
comparing Inner Northeast and Outer Southeast communities. Almost all land uses in INE will
see higher taxes since their MAV assessments on most land use categories account for less than
32% of market values, compared to the county average of 39.1%. Most properties in OSE will
see some reduction in their tax bills due to their MAVs being closer to their RMVs.
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Table 3 Changes in Tax Incidences under Three Tax Schemes with Revenue Neutrality18
Panel A: Current Property Tax - RMV Equal Rate Tax
Land Use Description
INNER NORTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4 units or more
Commercial
Commercial - Auto Related
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Vacant
OUTER SOUTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4 units or more
Commercial
Commercial - Auto Related
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Mobile Home
Vacant

#
Parcels

Current Tax

RMV Equal Rate Tax

Difference

Percent Change

8,371
575
87
237
12
31
34
32
242

32,058,762
2,074,539
3,413,178
1,664,848
37,118
512,896
130,789
179,981
320,084

45,858,723
3,727,544
5,314,564
3,332,170
86,572
913,953
240,192
321,414
824,904

13,799,961
1,653,006
1,901,386
1,667,322
49,454
401,057
109,403
141,432
504,820

43.0%
79.7%
55.7%
100.1%
133.2%
78.2%
83.6%
78.6%
157.7%

13,351
485
268
229
41
28
57
35
48
517

45,093,484
2,379,326
5,952,768
3,834,965
275,289
286,222
394,791
757,817
709,946
493,592

32,993,047
1,623,886
5,587,685
3,483,443
241,834
244,346
439,268
550,953
618,483
568,513

-12,100,437
-755,439
-365,082
-351,522
-33,455
-41,876
44,477
-206,863
-91,463
74,921

-26.8%
-31.8%
-6.1%
-9.2%
-12.2%
-14.6%
11.3%
-27.3%
-12.9%
15.2%

Panel B illustrates the results of simulated tax applications in the second stage, using RMV
assessment and derived split rates for reporting LVT results. When moving from an equal rate
tax on RMV assessments, tax shift shows more variation. This again is due to the differences in
LTV ratios across land use categories (see Table 2). Parcels indicated by high improvement
values relative to land values experience declines in their tax bills. For example, improvement
values being roughly 2.5 as much as land value, multi-family developments of more than 4 units
will see significant reductions in tax bills in both INE and OSE communities. This is consistent
with previous LVT research findings in Washington State and Marion County where the
multifamily category typically experienced the greatest negative tax shift among major land
uses.19,20 Of course, a larger number of dwelling units on a unit of land is a more efficient use of
land, hence is rewarded under a LVT tax system.
18

Tax-exempt properties and condos are dropped from this analysis
McIntire, J.; Gihring, T. (1999). Equity, Land Use, and Resource Land Impacts of Land Value Taxation in
Washington State. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
20
Gihring, T.; Nelson, K. (1999). Tax Shift—Sequential to a Land-Based Property Tax System in Salem, Oregon.
Available upon request.
19
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On the other hand, single family and smaller multi-family developments are slightly higher than
the total county-wide LTV ratio, hence are in the aggregate subject to a moderate positive tax
shift. Commercial uses are more likely to be nested within pedestrian-oriented commercial
“ribbons” in INE than commercial uses in OSE which are likely scattered along commercial strips
and in strip malls. Hence the difference in tax shift. Likewise, restaurants are likely found having
similar characteristics. Land utilization explains this difference in LVT taxation incentive effects.
As expected, vacant lands will be subject to the highest increase in tax burden, as total real
market value consists almost entirely of land. These distinctions will become more apparent
when comparing fully developed parcels and underutilized lands in next section.
Panel B: RMV Equal Rate Tax - Two-Rate (90-10) LVT
Land Use Description
INNER NORTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4+ units
Commercial
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Vacant
OUTER SOUTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4+ units
Commercial
Commercial - Auto
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Mobile Home
Vacant
Other

#
Parcels

RMV Equal
Tax Rate

Two-Rate (90-10)
LVT

Difference

Percent
Change

8,371
575
87
237
31
34
32
242

45,858,723
3,727,544
5,314,564
3,332,170
913,953
240,192
321,414
824,904

51,793,420
3,982,596
2,882,852
2,524,413
689,357
225,250
434,465
1,777,153

5,934,697
255,052
-2,431,711
-807,757
-224,596
-14,942
113,052
952,248

18.5%
12.3%
-71.2%
-48.5%
-43.8%
-11.4%
62.8%
297.5%

13,351
485
268
229
41
28
57
35
48
517
40

32,993,047
1,623,886
5,587,685
3,483,443
241,834
244,346
439,268
550,953
618,483
568,513
103,054

39,163,694
1,755,955
3,808,438
3,414,869
300,947
237,657
573,001
487,146
868,511
1,225,105
60,481

6,170,647
132,069
-1,779,247
-68,574
59,113
-6,689
133,733
-63,807
250,028
656,592
-42,573

13.7%
5.6%
-29.9%
-1.8%
21.5%
-2.3%
33.9%
-8.4%
35.2%
133.0%
-30.2%

Reforming the property tax system as proposed in these model simulations will not take the
form of stages as shown in this analysis. Stage 1 and 2 are for the purpose of showing the
separate effects of each change in the tax structure. In practice, an alternative tax being a local
option LVT will likely take place as a complete conversion. Panel C shows the total tax shift
effects of the change from the current MAV system with M5 and M50 limitations to a land
value tax. In INE, due to their productive use, multi-family parcels with at least four units
experience 15.5% reduction of tax duties. While all other land uses have to pay more taxes, in
part due to their low MAV/RMV ratio, the less productive the sites are, the more their tax
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duties increase. As vacant lands, commercial-auto related sites and warehouse have highest
LTV ratios, they witness the highest percentage changes. Similarly, while most parcels in OSE
have negative tax shifts (partly due to their MAV/RMV ratio above to the county’s average
value), multi-families with four units or more gain the most (a 36% decrease). Without
improvement, vacant lands have to pay significantly more under LVT.
Panel C: Current Property Tax - Two-Rate (90-10) LVT
Land Use Description
INNER NORTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4+ units
Commercial
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Vacant
OUTER SOUTHEAST
Single Family
Multi-family 2-4 units
Multi-family 4+ units
Commercial
Commercial - Auto
Office
Restaurant
Warehouse
Mobile Home
Vacant
Other

#
Parcels

Current Tax

Two-Rate (90-10)
LVT

Total Tax Shift

Total Percent
Change

8,371
575
87
237
31
34
32
242

32,058,762
2,074,539
3,413,178
1,664,848
512,896
130,789
179,981
320,084

51,793,420
3,982,596
2,882,852
2,524,413
689,357
225,250
434,465
1,777,153

19,734,658
1,908,057
-530,326
859,565
176,461
94,462
254,484
1,457,069

61.6%
92.0%
-15.5%
51.6%
34.4%
72.2%
141.4%
455.2%

13,351
485
268
229
41
28
57
35
48
517
40

45,093,484
2,379,326
5,952,768
3,834,965
275,289
286,222
394,791
757,817
709,946
493,592
141,062

39,163,694
1,755,955
3,808,438
3,414,869
300,947
237,657
573,001
487,146
868,511
1,225,105
60,481

-5,929,790
-623,370
-2,144,330
-420,096
25,659
-48,565
178,210
-270,671
158,566
731,513
-80,582

-13.1%
-26.2%
-36.0%
-11.0%
9.3%
-17.0%
45.1%
-35.7%
22.3%
148.2%
-57.1%

The tax shift can also be seen from comparing changes in mill rates by land uses before and
after switching to LVT. Implementing changes to property tax systems will create disparate
impacts to mill rates depending on land use type. The relatively low MAV/RMV ratio of
properties in the Inner-Northeast community all but guarantees an increase in levy under RMV
tax, even with the 57.5% decrease in LCA rates. Under RMV tax, Outer-Southeast gets a
decrease in tax rate on average for each land use class, with the largest decrease coming for
Single Family Residential properties.
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Table 4: Average Levy under Four Tax Regimes by Community

Land Use
Single Family
Multi-Family
Mobile Home
Commercial
Office
Restaurant
Industrial
Vacant
Total

INNER NORTHEAST
90/10
MAV
RMV
LVT
$3,830
$5,478
$6,187
$8,290 $13,659 $10,371
$6,697
$16,545
$3,847
$26,486
$1,323
$4,203

$13,310
$29,482
$7,064
$15,760
$3,409
$6,303

$10,923
$22,237
$6,625
$3,795
$7,344
$6,695

60/40
LVT
$5,632
$12,946
$12,793
$27,911
$6,969
$13,166
$4,262
$6,388

OUTER SOUTHEAST
90/10
RMV
LVT
$2,471
$2,933
$9,577
$7,390
$12,885
$18,094
$13,797
$13,762
$8,727
$8,488
$7,706
$10,053
$32,660
$8,814
$1,100
$2,370
$3,060
$3,420

MAV
$3,378
$11,065
$14,791
$15,223
$10,222
$6,926
$27,458
$955
$3,964

60/40
LVT21
$2,571
$9,103
$14,014
$13,790
$8,675
$8,215
$27,490
$1,375
$3,138

For all broad land use classes but one, average levy rates increase with higher rates of LVT (see
Figure 5). Multi-Family properties are the one land use class for which effective tax rates are
reduced. This suggests that any increased rate for land value relative to improvement value,
beyond incentives created, will benefit—and incentivize the development of—Multi-Family
properties.
Figure 5: Effective Mill Rates under Three Tax Scenarios, by Property Type and Community
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Whether each property pays more or less under each tax shift is determined by a combination
of two factors: the MAV/RMV and Land to Total Value (LTV) ratios. This is represented in the
MAV/RMV tax shift columns of Table 5 below. The majority of properties in INE pay more with a
switch to RMV, emblematic of their consistent high value growth relative to other areas. Only

21

This LVT Ratio will be introduced into the model in the mitigation section.
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9% of OSE properties pay more with an RMV tax, with the remainder paying less (consistent
with their higher than average LTV ratios).
The share of properties paying more from a switch from RMV to LVT systems is entirely
determined by the size of the property’s LTV ratio relative to the county average of 39.5%. For
example, 83% and 86% of single family properties in INE and OSE, respectively, have a higher
LTV ratio than the county average, rendering an increase in tax. The final column for each
community is the combined effect of each factor. Again, most properties in the INE community
pay more. In the OSE, despite majorities of vacant lots, and commercial buildings paying more,
only 26% of properties would pay more than they are currently paying under an LVT.
Table 5: Shares facing Positive Tax Shift by Land Use

Land Use
Single Family
Multi-Family
Mobile Home
Commercial
Office
Restaurant
Vacant
Totals

Total
Parcels
8,371
662
281
31
34
242
9,623

INNER NORTHEAST
MAV/RMV RMV-LVT
tax shift
tax shift
85%
83%
98%
65%
97%
94%
91%
74%
86%

40%
55%
47%
100%
81%

MAV-LVT
tax shift
88%
94%
88%
74%
85%
100%
89%

Total
Parcels
13,351
753
48
270
28
57
517
15,030

OUTER SOUTHEAST
MAV/RMV RMV-LVT
tax shift
tax shift
6%
86%
12%
57%
31%
92%
54%
67%
25%
64%
58%
79%
47%
100%
9%
84%

MAV-LVT
tax shift
23%
14%
63%
59%
36%
82%
99%
26%

Figure 6 below displays the effective mill rates resulting from the 90/10 LVT. The separate rates
on land and improvement value results in a significantly more balanced rate distribution than in
Figure 4 above. Furthermore, a LVT system would be slightly income progressive (as opposed to
the marked regressivity shown in Figure 4). OSE is in red, while INE is in blue.
Figure 6: Effective LVT Mill Rate by Income and Community
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Incentivizing Development
One of the most important theoretical advantages of LVT is its potential effect on incentivizing
land owners to make the best use of their land, while at the same time discouraging land
speculation. In the current tax system, redevelopment increases the MAV—bringing it much
closer to the RMV, and significantly increasing the taxes levied. This section considers how
differently the two-rate LVT may affect parcels with different levels of land utilization. Our
analysis also examines the mechanism through which LVT may provide incentives for owners of
underutilized sites to put their land to more productive use.
The model simulation method classifies parcels by land utilization status: fully developed or
underutilized. Two criteria are combined to make this distinction: i) observed utilization of
zoned development capacity; and ii) the LTV ratio. A parcel is treated as underutilized if its LTV
ratio > 0.66 (i.e. its land value is more than double the improvement value). The assumption is
that an underutilized site is economically unproductive and would become more productive if
redeveloped. To meet the physical utilization threshold, a parcel’s building bulk (density) must
reach at least 20% of its maximum development capacity as specified by its zoning designation.
Both threshold criteria (< 0.66 and > .20) must be met for a parcel to be classified fully
developed.
Concerning the physical utilization criterion, a parcel’s zoning designation is used to determine
its maximum development limit. For single-family residential parcels (R2.5, R5, R7, R10, R20 and
RF zones), the maximum number of allowed units is determined by dividing the total parcel
area by the maximum density. For multi-family residential parcels (R1, R2, R3 and IR zones), the
maximum number of residential units is calculated by dividing the total parcel area by the
maximum density. In both cases, the rounding rules specified in the City of Portland’s Land
Division Information Guide are adopted. For commercial zones, the total parcel area is
multiplied by zone-based maximum floor area ratio (FAR) to obtain the allowed building square
footage. The data base contains existing square footage of building area for all developed
parcels.
The level of observed utilization of zoned development capacity is expressed as the percentage
of development capacity currently used in terms either of lots, residential units or areas. For
example, each parcel in the single-family residential zones is counted as one lot. Then its level
of physical utilization is obtained by one divided by its maximum number of allowed lots. As the
number of existing residential units in multi-family areas are not available, it is estimated by
dividing total building areas by the maximum density without rounding22. The only exception is
the industrial zones where no FAR or other similar limits on maximum development capacity is
available to calculate the first indicator. Thus all vacant industrial properties are assigned to the
“less than 20%” group while other industrial lands are mapped into the “at least 20%” group.
22

Apart from exempt properties, a few parcels were dropped from the sample due to their lacks of necessary data.

Northwest Economic
Research Center

LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: Simulating the Effects in Multnomah County

23

Figure 7 below compares changes in mill rates23 between underutilized and fully developed
parcels under current property tax and two tax simulations while holding county-level tax
revenue unchanged. As expected, sites utilized more intensively experience comparatively lower
mill rates under LVT.
With the change from the current tax system using MAV assessments to RMV equal rate
taxation, overall tax burden increases in Inner Northeast, but decreases in Inner Southeast
regardless of land use efficiency, due to the differences in the MAV / RMV ratio. However,
when adopting LVT, the divergence in tax burden between the two utilization groups becomes
unambiguous. Underutilized parcels witness significant increases in both communities, while
the fully developed parcels will pay minimal additional taxes. Note here that lots classified as
“fully developed” meet both criteria but are not necessarily developed to full allowable
capacity.
Figure 7: Effective Mill Rates: Underdeveloped and Developed Land Parcels
Current Property Tax

RMV Equal Rate Tax
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Note also that developed sites are likely to have improvement value accounting for a larger share
of total property value than underutilized parcels (Table 6), and improvements are taxed at
substantially lower rates than land. Fully developed lands still pay a marginally higher tax after
exempting Measures 5 and 50 limitations and switching to 90/10 LVT. The reason is they still have
higher land value’s share of total value than the average of the county (which is 39.5%) (see the
table below).
Table 6: Land and Improvement Market Value as Shares of Total Real Market Value
Area

Land Utilization Status

INNER
NORTHEAST

Fully Developed

OUTER
SOUTHEAST
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# Parcels

Share of Total Real Market Value
Land

Improvement

8,733

41.1%

58.9%

523

88.5%

11.5%

Fully Developed

11,341

41.9%

58.2%

Underutilized

1,342

80.4%

18.6%

Underutilized

Data are expressed as percentage of total real market value
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Compared to the current property tax, underutilized lands pay significantly higher taxes, while
developed lots experience either tax reductions as in Outer Southeast, or substantially smaller
increases as in Inner Northeast.
These incentive-based tax shifts are intended to encourage the owners of underutilized sites,
particularly vacant lots, to invest in improving their properties. Some owners will pay higher tax
bills due to the change to higher real market values. Nevertheless, such increases are marginal;
even relatively low returns on their capital investments suffice to cover them. For example,
suppose that underutilized sites are redeveloped in such a way that increases the market value
of their improvements by 200% while land market values are unchanged.
Table 7 below illustrates changes in their total property value and their tax bills. With this
assumed improvement, on the one hand, the total value of underutilized parcels increases by
over 20% and 35% in INE and OSE respectively. However, these substantial value increases are
associated with modestly higher tax bills (3% and 5% respectively)24. If the minimum required
return on investment (ROI) is defined as the ratio between the amount of tax increased and the
change in the improvement values of these underutilized lands, then under our assumptions
the minimum ROI is only 0.26% and 0.22% in INE and OSE, respectively.
Table 7: Tax Shift with 50% Increase in Improvement Value of All Underutilized Parcels
% Growth in
Improvement Value

% Increase in Total
Real Market Value

% Increase in Total
LVT

Required Return to
Investment

Inner Northeast

200%

23.06%

2.85%

0.26%

Outer Southeast

200%

37.63%

5.01%

0.22%

Commercial Corridor Analysis
In addition to looking at how LVT incentivizes development for INE and OSE in general, it can be
helpful to focus on commercial corridors in particular. Portland city land use policies encourage
more pedestrian-friendly commercial settings – akin to the ‘main street’ configuration, as
opposed to the sprawling pattern of commercial strips.25 The question is whether LVT
incentivizes more compact commercial development. Figure 8 shows the four commercial
corridors analyzed in Inner-Northeast Portland: North Mississippi Ave., North Williams Ave., NE
Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., and NE Alberta Street. Only commercial uses within the corridors
are included in the data for analysis.

24
25

The actual investment would be more than the 100% improvement value when accounting for permits etc.
City of Portland. “2035 Comprehensive Plan”. Page GP3-10. (December 2018). Retrieved from:
www.portlandoregon.gov/bps
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Figure 8: Map of Commercial Corridors in Inner-Northeast Portland

A commercial property is defined as underutilized or fully developed following the
methodology described above. An additional challenge to the modeling of redevelopment
scenarios is determining the amount each underutilized property increases in improvement
value. For this analysis, NERC assumes that each underutilized tax lot will redevelop to a level
where the land value is reduced to 25% of the total value (.25 LTV ratio). This ratio is consistent
with other newly developed lands in the INE.
The four figures below (9, 10, 11, and 12) reveal the average amount of taxes paid by fully
developed, underutilized, and redeveloped commercial parcels under the three different tax
rates in each of the four commercial corridors. Notably, under the current system there is a
strong disincentive to redevelop land, as new improvements significantly increase the amount
of taxes owed annually. Moving from the current tax system to an LVT would incentivize
redevelopment in each of these commercial corridors.
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Figure 9: North Williams Commercial Corridor Redevelopment Scenario, Mean Taxes
$90,000
$80,000
$70,000
$60,000
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
Fully developed
Mean MAV Levy

Underutlized
Mean RMV Levy

Redeveloped
Mean 90% LVT Levy

Figure 10: North Mississippi Commercial Corridor Redevelopment Scenario, Mean Taxes
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Figure 11: Northeast MLK Commercial Corridor Redevelopment Scenario, Mean Taxes
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Figure 12: Northeast Alberta Commercial Corridor Redevelopment Scenario, Mean Taxes
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What first becomes obvious is the tax burden difference between underutilized and fully
developed properties under the conventional equal rate tax system utilizing both MAV and
RMV assessments. Underutilizing, or in some cases neglecting, structural improvements on
commercial sites leads to significantly lower low property taxes.
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Changing to the 90/10 LVT tax regime, a much smaller increase in tax burden is experienced
under the redevelopment scenario. In the N. Mississippi corridor, redeveloped properties in the
aggregate actually see a lower tax burden compared to the current MAV levy on fully
developed sites due to the relatively high value of property and level of utilization in that
corridor (see Figure 10).

Mitigation
Under LVT, specific situations may create disproportionate and unintended hardship for
landowners. These situations can create hesitancy toward a switch to any form of LVT, and thus
some form of mitigation or exemption is needed. For some land uses, such as farms, the most
efficient land use may not provide society the greatest benefit and should be excluded from
LVT policies. In other situations, long standing homeowners who may have seen a massive
increase in their property value over a long period of time, but who have not seen an
equivalent increase in their income could see an untenable increase to their property tax
payment. Here, we discuss a few oft-cited hardship cases and potential mitigation methods.
The highest and best use may not always be deemed the best use of land. Farms provide value
without full development. With a switch to LVT farms could see a large increase to their
property tax payments. As it is not the intention of LVT to incentivize the building of highdensity housing on farmland, farms could be excluded from a shift to LVT and remain under an
RMV tax structure exempt from M5 & M50, or given a current use exemption that allows them
to continue to operate without undue tax burden. It should be emphasized that there are not
many farms with the Portland Urban Growth Boundary and farm land is often assessed at a
significantly lower land value—meaning that there likely will be little need for exemptions.26
Another situation requiring separate policies under a switch to LVT (or RMV) is households that
are asset rich but cash poor. This commonly occurs in urban areas that have seen high
appreciation in properties’ values over the last 15 to 30 years. A homeowner may have
purchased a home when property values were lower, leaving them with a valuable asset.
However, the same homeowner’s wages may not have appreciated at the same rate as their
property, leaving them with most of their assets tied up in their home. Under a switch to LVT,
this type of homeowner would see an increase to their property tax payment, but may be
unable to afford the increase, especially if it is substantial. In these scenarios, mitigation
techniques are often used to offset the burden for the impacted homeowners.
A variety of mitigation techniques have been proposed to smooth the transition to LVT for
those who are asset rich and low-income, and Oregon currently has other tax deferrals that
could be extended to help such households. One option is to grandfather households who are
26

Fiscal Policy Center, University of Washington. (1999). Resource Lands in Clark and Grant Counties.
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asset rich and low-income into their previous property tax payments until death or the sale of
the property (either allowing the tax payments to increase at some fixed growth rate or
continuing under the current tax system).
Another mitigation model for this scenario involves introducing LVT with a gradual increasing
split rate over a period of time. Instead of a 90/10 land to improvement value ratio, the first
year of implementation might begin with a 60/40 land-to-total value split. This then gradually
increases over a number of years, easing the transition period for cost-burdened homeowners
(see Figure 13 for how this transition may occur).
Figure 13: LVT Graduated Split Rates
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Oregon currently uses other mitigation techniques to lower property taxes for those who
experience undue burden from their tax situation. One, which could be expanded with a switch
to LVT is the current tax deferral for disabled and senior citizens who own property.27 Under the
current laws, disabled and senior property owners can apply for a property tax deferral if they
meet certain qualifications. Similar deferrals could be granted to those who are asset rich but
house poor under an LVT model.
Another tax application model crafted as an alternative to LVT is the Assessment Exemption of
Improvements (AXI) model developed by the Center for the Study of Economics28.
The AXI Model
Unlike the split-rate LVT system, the AXI method uses an equal rate for both land and
improvement assessments. In order to create a similar investment incentive as LVT, a fixed
amount of improvement value is exempted from taxation from all properties. All else constant,
27
28

Oregon Department of Revenue: ORS 311.666-ORS 311.701. Available at wwww.oregon.gov/DOR/deferral
Center for the Study of Economics. (2009). Land Value Taxation in Philadelphia. Available at www.urbantools.org
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this results in lower effective tax rates for properties with building value near the exemption
level and removes the disincentive to build up to highest and best use value. It becomes
evident that by adopting the AXI model low value structures—usually owned by lower income
occupants—will receive the largest benefit.
Figure 14: Illustration of Tax Shift Rate Calculation Maintaining Constant Revenue
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For a brief assessment of how the AXI system might compare to LVT, we first find the share of
property tax coming from land value, i.e. the land tax ratio, for different LVT ratios. We then
calculate the AXI universal building value exemption required to achieve a comparable land tax
ratio. As with the other models, levy rates are adjusted to maintain revenue neutrality. A 90/10
LVT system results in 85.5% of property tax revenue coming from land value. To achieve the
same land tax ratio, the first $30 million of building value would need to be exempt. A 60/40
LVT results in a more feasible exemption figure, with an AXI exemption of $159,931 of
improvement value or around 83.25% of the median building value in Multnomah County. To
maintain revenue neutrality, LCA rates would need to increase around 29% to an effective rate
of $12.62 per $1,000 of non-exempt property value.
Table 8: Simulated AXI Exemption Levels
LVT Ratio

Land Tax
Ratio

BV Exempt.
Improvement
Ratio
Value Exemption

90/10

85.5%

15510%

$

29,976,177

$ 81,947,747,610

80/20

72.3%

2636%

$

5,094,597

$ 69,264,546,007

70/30

60.4%

299%

$

578,554

$ 52,794,606,483

60/40

49.5%

83%

$

159,931

$ 31,437,688,852
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Figure 16 shows effective mill rates for the current tax system, a 60/40 LVT, and an AXI
exemption of $159,931 across estimated median household income.29 Both alternative tax
models are more progressive with respect to income than the current tax system. The pattern
suggests that the 60/40 LVT and AXI would reduce rates on average for census tracts with
median income below $60,000, with AXI resulting in the lowest effective rates. In the areas for
which we have estimates of median household income, AXI results in lower effective rates for
all income levels except the $70,000 income group. This suggests AXI is a potential mitigating
measure for the tax shift to LVT, while providing comparable progressivity.
Figure 15 below shows the shares of properties that would pay less or more under an AXI tax
structure compared to the current MAV system and the proposed 90/10 LVT. The vast majority
of residential and industrial properties would pay a lower levy under the AXI system relative to
the current system, while commercial and vacant properties would pay more. Much of this is
due to the rate changes of the shift to an RMV system. However, compared directly to the
90/10 LVT, majorities of residential, commercial, and vacant properties would pay less under an
AXI system, while the majority of industrial properties would pay more.
Figure 15: Count of Tax Shifts from AXI by Land Use Class
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The $20,000 income block includes those from $20,000 to $29,999, with similar groupings for later blocks.
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Figure 16: Effective Mill Rates for Mitigating Policies by Median Household Income Groups
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One potential downside of AXI relative to LVT is its limited impact on incentives. While LVT
incentivizes development for all properties by reducing improvement value tax rates, the
incentives created by the AXI model are limited to properties with improvement value below
the exemption. Properties with low improvement values, such as vacant lots, will face no
increase in property tax for developing up to the exemption, but all properties with
improvement values at or above the exemption rate face higher tax rates for any development.
This implies that the mitigation effects of AXI would largely apply to single family dwellings
rather than multifamily or commercial properties.

Conclusion
Ultimately, land-based property tax systems, whether a split-rate LVT or an AXI building
exemption tax, do what they are designed to do—place more of the tax burden on wealthier
land-owners, and encourage the highest and best use of land. Based on the simulations
performed on the INE and OSE communities, a LVT would provide a more equitable tax
structure, incentivize structure upgrading and development of underutilized properties, and
discourage “holding” land for speculative purposes. Furthermore, the potential downsides of
the tax policy—such as increasing taxes on low-income homeowners—can be mitigated with
carefully crafted legislation. In short, many of the inequities created by Measure 5 and 50
would likely be reversed if a LVT were implemented in the Portland region.
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